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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

LETTERS PATENT APPEAL No 576 of 1999

in

SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATIONNo 9629 of 1992

with

SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION No 10744 of 1993

For Approval and Signature:

 

Hon'ble MR.JUSTICE R.K.ABICHANDANI

and

Hon'ble MR.JUSTICE M.C.PATEL

============================================================

1. Whether Reporters of Local Papers may

JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ

to see the judgements? YES

2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? YES :

3. Whether Their Lordships wish to see the fair copy : NO

of the judgement? NO

4. Whether this case involves a substantial question : NO

of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution

of India, 1950 of any Order made thereunder? NO

5. Whether it is to be circulated to the Civil Judge? : NO

NO

--------------------------------------------------------------

SURAT PANJRAPOLE

Versus

STATE OF GUJARAT

--------------------------------------------------------------

Appearance:

1. LETTERS PATENT APPEAL No. 576 of 1999

MS KJ BRAHMBHATT for Appellants

MR UA TRIVEDI, AGP for Respondent No. 1

MR SN SHELAT, ADVOCATE GENERAL with

MR PRANAV G DESAI for Respondent No. 4 & 6

MR SUNIT S SHAH for Respondent No. 3

MR GN SHAH for Respondent No. 5

MR PRASHANT G DESAI for Respondent No. 2

2. Special Civil ApplicationNo 10744 of 1993

MR JR NANAVATI for Appellants

MR PRASHANT G DESAI for Respondent No.1

MR MR SHAH for Respondent No. 2

--------------------------------------------------------------

CORAM : MR.JUSTICE R.K.ABICHANDANI

and

MR.JUSTICE M.C.PATEL

Date of decision: 27/03/2001

ORAL COMMON JUDGEMENT

(Per : MR.JUSTICE R.K.ABICHANDANI)

1. Both these matters raise common questions and are

argued together. The Special Civil Application No.

10744 of 1993 was referred by the learned Single Judge on

4-8-1994 to a Division Bench, and by order dated

4-11-1999, was required to be heard with the Letters

Patent Appeal No. 576 of 1999.

2. The common question that arises in these two

matters is, whether plots reserved for "Sub Centre" in

the Town Planning Schemes can be handed over by the

appropriate authority, which in the present case is the

Surat Municipal Corporation, for development to other

authorities for their use for setting up telephone

exchange or offices of the nationalised banks and of the

I.O.C., and as to whether such entrustment amounts to

variation or change in the Scheme.

3. The Letters Patent Appeal No. 576 of 1999 arises

from Special Civil Application No.9629 of 1992, in which

the petitioner - Trust through its trustees sought a

direction against the respondent - Municipal Corporation

to withdraw its decision contained in the resolution No.

86 dated 9-4-1992 passed by the Standing Committee, at

Annexure `B' to that petition, by which it was resolved

to lease out the lands of final plot No. M/4 sub-plots

Nos. P-1, P-3, P-4 and P-5 to the Banks and the Indian

Oil Corporation Ltd. as mentioned therein for

development on the terms and conditions determined by the

Corporation in its General Meeting dated 15-12-1991, and

further prayed for de-reserving the said final plot no.

M/4 from the reservation made for "Sub Centre" in the

Town Planning Scheme No. 9 (Majura), and to restore the

same to the petitioner - Trust.

3.1 The Special Civil Application No. 10744 of 1993

has been filed by a Power of Attorney of the original

owners of survey No. 489/1, 489/2/P and 489/2/C of

Adajan, raising a similar challenge against the leasing

out of the land of final plot No. 33 of the Town

Planning Scheme No. 12 which was reserved for "Sub

Centre" to the Telecommunication Department for putting

up a Telephone Exchange and seeking a direction for

setting aside the resolution No. 522 dated 26th May

1993, at Annexure `H' to that petition, passed by the

Standing Committee of the respondent - Municipal

Corporation, by which it was resolved to handover the

final plot No. 33 admeasuring 6527 sq. mtrs. in the

Town Planning Scheme No.12 to the Telecommunication

Department on lease for development purpose. The

petitioners also sought a direction on the

Telecommunication Department to handover the possession

of the plot back to the respondent Municipal Corporation.

The Power of Attorney which is produced on the record was

executed on 17th September 1993, whereby it was decided

to empower its holder to take steps and to litigate for

the purpose of getting the original plots including the

land of the original plot No. 491/1 and other lands

de-reserved. The power of attorney is described as

irrevocable power of attorney and the power of attorney

holder is empowered to approach the High Court and the

Supreme Court for getting the lands de-reserved.

4. According to the petitioners of Special Civil

Application No. 9629 of 1992, from which the Letters

Patent Appeal No. 576 of 1999 arises, the petitioner

Trust is a Public Charitable Trust, with its objectives

to take care of stray, abandoned, weak and handicapped

cattle which may be in the process of being sent to

slaughter house. The Trust held about 1,76,739 sq.

mtrs. of land in the municipal area of Surat. This land

was covered in the Town Planning Scheme No. 9 (Majura)

as per the original plot No. 5825-C. On reconstitution

of the plots, the Trust got final plot No. 5825-C

admeasuring 1,24,667 sq. mtrs. and according to the

petitioner - Trust, it was deprived of 52,072 sq. mtrs.

of land, for which compensation of Rs.3,59,193=00 was

paid to the Trust after adjusting the incremental charge.

Out of the said land admeasuring 52,072 sq. mtrs., which

was placed under reservation (for a sub-center), final

plot No. M/4 was demarcated and out of that plot,

sub-plots Nos. P-1, P-3, P-4 and P-5 were carved out.

The land of plot No. M/4 admeasuring 6443 sq. mtrs.

included some portion of the petitioners' lands. Out of

these sub-plots, land of sub-plot No. P-1 admeasuring

2250 sq. mtrs. was allotted to the State Bank of India,

the land of sub-plots No. P-3 and P-4 admeasuring 2400

sq. mtrs. were allotted to the Indian Oil Corporation

Ltd. and the land of sub-plot No.5 admeasuring 2387 sq.

mtrs. was allotted to the Bank of India. Thus, an

aggregate of these sub-plots Nos. P-1, P-3, P-4 and P-5

of 10,061.19 sq. mtrs. of land was allotted to these

authorities. According to the petitioners, their basic

challenge against such a course was that the land which

was reserved for "Sub-center" could not have been

diverted for the purpose of allotment to such

institutions, and that such allotment was not for any

public purpose. The grievance of the petitioner - Trust

was that it was paid only a sum of Rs.3,59,193=00 for

their land, while the Corporation had made a huge profit

by transferring a part of such land for nearly

Rs.6,87,430=00. The petitioner therefore has challenged

the resolution, and seeks de-reservation of these lands

for being restored to the petitioner - Trust.

4.1 The Surat Municipal Corporation contested the

petition by contending in its affidavit-in-reply that the

Town Planning Scheme No.9 had become a part of the

Gujarat Town Planning & Urban Development Act, 1976, as

provided by section 65(3) thereof after it was sanctioned

on 24-2-1984, and came into force from 23-4-1984. The

lands in question which were reserved for "sub-center"

for public purposes had vested in the Corporation free

from all encumbrances, as provided by section 67(a) of

the Act, and therefore, the petitioners were not entitled

to put up any claim in respect thereof. It is stated

that, after the Town Planning Scheme was framed, the

petitioners were re-allotted 1,24,667 sq. mtrs. of land

and the remaining portion of land was put under

reservation for different public purposes like road site,

sub-station, site for school etc. The petitioners had

taken advantage of the re-allotted plots and had also

accepted the compensation worked out after adjustment.

According to the respondent - Corporation, the land was

being used for public purpose for which it was reserved

as it was being utilized for "sub-center". The said Town

Planning Scheme No. 9 (Majura) covered a total area of

110 hectors. The local authority had declared its

intention to prepare a draft scheme by its resolution No.

41 dated 21-6-1965 and the draft scheme was approved by

the State Government on 19-5-1971. The preliminary

scheme was prepared under the said Act and sanctioned on

12-12-1980 by the State Government. The preliminary

scheme came into force from 27-1-1981 and on its coming

into force, all rights of the petitioners were settled

and the lands which were meant for public purpose vested

in the respondent No.2 - Corporation free from all

encumbrances. A final scheme was sanctioned under the

notification issued by the State Government on 24-2-1984.

According to the Corporation, the Town Planning Officer

while determining the value of the land under section

32(1)(iii) of the Bombay Town Planning Act (which

corresponded to section 52(3) of the Act of 1976), had

decided whether the reservation of the plot was wholly or

partially beneficial to the owners or residents of the

scheme and as regards plot No. M/4, it was held that it

was 3/4th beneficial to the owners or residents of the

scheme and 1/4th beneficial to the general public.

According to the Corporation, though the expression

`sub-center' is not defined, the town planner had opined

that the use of land which was reserved for sub-center

can be for health center, library, market, school,

playground and other public purposes. It is stated in

the affidavit in reply that, as per the allotment made to

the respondents No. 3 to 5, it was already made clear

that the land will be used as per the Town Planning

Scheme and Building Bye-laws. It is stated that these

respondents were public bodies and they are going to use

the land for public purposes. It is pointed out that the

Corporation has already handed over the possession of the

land in question to the respondents No. 3 to 5 who have

paid a total sum of Rs.6,05,60,155=00 to the Corporation.

Since the land had vested in the Corporation, there was

no scope of any de-reservation of the land.

4.2 The respondents No. 3 to 5 who have been given

sub-plots on lease have filed affidavits contesting the

petition. The respondent No.5 - Indian Oil Corporation

Ltd. in the affidavit in reply filed on its behalf has

stated that, an aggregate amount of Rs.3,60,49,330=00 is

paid by the I.O.C. to the Municipal Corporation for the

sub-plots in question, which admeasure 5424 sq. mtrs.

The land was given under the lease deed executed on

26-11-1992 and the I.O.C. has incurred stamp charges of

Rs.50,51,150=00 in respect thereof, as also the

applicable registration charges.

4.3 In the affidavit in reply filed on behalf of the

respondent No.4 - Bank, while contesting the petition, it

is pointed out that the respondent No.4 has already made

a payment of Rs.1,05,46,875=00 towards the premium for

the development rights as well as lease consideration and

it has been put in possession of the sub-plot No. P-1

since 21-11-1992. It is stated that the respondent No.4

is established under the State Bank of India Act, 1955,

and majority of its shares are held by the Government of

India. It is stated that the land in question is going

to be used for public purpose. It is contended that the

expression `sub-center' derives its colour from the

expression `civic-center' and such centers are reserved

for locating administrative offices, post offices, banks,

clubs, building for recreational and cultural purpose

etc. which are in the nature of public amenities

provided for the residents of the area. It is also

contended that the banking services, apart from being a

nerve center for business, commerce and industry, are

absolutely essential even for the common man, and that,

in the prevailing situation in the city, it was

imperative for the local authority to make available land

for providing and maintaining essential services such as

banking in the area.

4.4 Similar stand is taken in the affidavit in reply

filed on behalf of the respondent No.6 - Bank and it is

pointed out that the respondent No.6 has already made a

payment of Rs.1,98,98,771=00 towards the premium for the

development rights as well as lease consideration and

that, it has been already put in possession of sub-plot

No. P-6, which is going to be used for the purpose of

sub-center for which it is reserved, because, it intends

to construct a building complex for its administrative

offices, training center and branch.

4.5 The respondent No.3 - Bank has also in its

affidavit in reply stated that it has already paid a sum

of Rs.1,39,63,950=00 towards the premium for the

development rights as well as lease consideration and

that, it has been put in possession of sub-plot No. P-5,

in which it intends to construct a building complex for

its regional office and a branch and also to provide

residential accommodation for its officers working in the

regional office and branches in the city. According to

the respondent No.3, sub-plot No. P-5 is thus going to

be used for the purpose of sub-center, for which it was

reserved.

5. In Special Civil Application No. 10744 of 1993,

according to the petitioners, the lands bearing survey

No. 489/1, 489/2/P and 489/2/C of Adajan belonged to

them. The Corporation declared its intention to make a

town planning scheme for the area of Adajan by issuing a

public notice on 16-8-1974 under section 22(1) of the

Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954. A draft scheme was

prepared for the area under sub-section (2) of section 42

of the Gujarat Town Planning & Urban Development Act,

1976 inviting objections, and after considering the

objections and following the required procedure,

preliminary town planning scheme No. 12 (Adajan) was

made under the notification dated 20th April 1977 issued

by the Government. The Government in exercise of its

powers under section 65 of the Act of 1976 sanctioned the

scheme by its notification dated 21st February 1987,

fixing 27th March 1987 as the date for the purpose of

clause 65(2)(b) of the Act. By notification dated 30th

March 1990, the final scheme was sanctioned and the 1st

of May 1990 was the date fixed for the purpose of section

65(2)(b) of the Act. The lands of the petitioners were

covered by the said scheme. Survey No. 489/1/P became

part of final plot No.33 (which included lands of others

also), and survey Nos. 489/2/B, 489/2/C and 489/1/P were

given final plot No.34. The final plot No.33 was

reserved under the scheme for "sub-center" and in the

remarks column, it was mentioned that the said sub-center

was for school, health center, market etc. According to

the petitioners, their power of attorney holder was

informed by the Municipal corporation by its letter dated

27th August 1993 with reference to his application dated

26th August 1993 that, the town planning scheme No.12 was

sanctioned by the Government and the use of "sub-center"

in that regard was shown for the purpose of school,

health center and market. According to the petitioners,

the reservation of final plot No.33 for "sub-center"

became the public purpose as if the same were enacted in

the Act and became the statutory purpose in law, which

could not be changed and therefore, the respondent

Corporation was bound in law to use the said final plot

No.33 only for the purpose of "sub-center" namely,

school, health center, market etc. and that, it was not

competent to change the statutory purpose of reservation

under the scheme and make the land available for any

other purpose. By resolution No. 522 made on 26th May

1993, the respondent - Corporation gave a lease, for 99

years, of the land admeasuring 6527 sq. mtrs. of final

plot No. 33, to the Telecommunication Department, which

according to the petitioners amounted to contravention of

the provisions of the Act and the Rules, and violated the

proprietary rights of the petitioners and contravened the

provisions of Article 14, 19(1)(f) and 300-A of the

Constitution. The impugned resolution is challenged on

the ground that it is illegal, arbitrary and without

jurisdiction and contravene the fundamental rights of the

petitioners and their proprietary rights. Though in the

body of the petition, the impugned resolution is

challenged on the ground that it adversely affects the

proprietary rights of the petitioners and violates

Article 14, 19(1)(f) and 300-A of the Constitution, in

the prayer clause, a direction is sought that the

Telecommunication Department should handover the

possession of the said plot back to the respondent -

Municipal corporation.

5.1 The Municipal Corporation contesting the petition

has stated in the affidavit in reply filed on its behalf

that, the final plot No. 33 which was reserved for

sub-center for Surat Municipal Corporation, was

reconstituted not only from survey No. 489/1, but also

from revenue survey Nos. 488/1 and 490. The owners of

survey Nos. 489/2/B and 489/2/C were given a total area

of the said survey numbers and a large part of the area

of survey No. 489/1 by reconstituting the final plot No.

34. The final plot No. 33 was reserved for "sub-center"

for developing the public facilities like health center,

market, offices, post office, bank, telephone centers

etc. According to the Corporation, there was no change

in the public purpose for which the plot was reserved.

It is stated that the uses which were mentioned namely,

school, health center, market etc., were not exhaustive

but only illustrative, and that the word `sub-center'

means a center for public utility services like bus,

telephones, shops, school, market, post office, police

station etc. and it does not mean only health center,

school and market. In the map of the town planning

scheme which is attached to the affidavit in reply, it is

pointed out that, the final plot No. 33 reserved for

sub-center is as per the legend described a plot for

public purposes.

5.2 The respondent No.2 - Telecommunication

Department of the Union of India in the affidavit in

reply filed on its behalf stated that, the final plot No.

33 was handed over to the respondent no.2 on 14-7-1993

and a payment of Rs.1,46,85,750=00 was made to the

Municipal corporation, and a possession receipt is

annexed at Annexure R/1 to the affidavit in reply. This

plot was allotted for the purpose of construction of

Telephone Exchange of 25,000 lines in Rander area of

Surat city, which was in the interest of public at large.

It is pointed out that there is a long waiting list for

telephones in Rander area and therefore, it was necessary

to construct a telephone exchange at the earliest. The

Telecommunication Department is likely to invest an

amount of Rs. 20 crores for providing cables and

exchange equipment in the interest of public facility.

It was necessary to have a bigger plot like 7,000 sq.

mtrs. so as to enable the Telecommunication Department

to instal telephone exchange having capacity of 25,000

lines.

6. In Special Civil Application No. 9629 of 1992,

the learned Single Judge by his elaborate judgement

rendered on 1-2-1999 held that the expression `public

purposes of all kinds' in section 40(3)(e) of the Act

would show that the reservation of land for public

purposes was not confined to any particular purpose and

that, there may be more than one purpose for which the

land may be provided in the scheme. It was held that the

word `sub-center' had acquired its definite meaning in

the field of town planning and when it was said that a

particular land was reserved for "sub-center", it would

mean that there will be a center to serve the various

purposes which are essentially for the public, living in

that area. The learned Single Judge referred to the

General Development Control Regulation, 1986,

particularly its Appendix `H', which provided for zoning

regulations, which showed in the tabulated form that

residential zone primarily would include public

assistance, institutions, banks and other types of

developments, including the places of public assembly,

places of public utility and services, civic buildings

etc. It was held that if the land is allotted or sold to

the banks by the Corporation, it cannot be said that it

was beyond the scope of public purpose. It was also held

that the very fact that, even the sale of the reserved

land is made permissible under section 40(3)(jj) of the

Act, goes to show that it was not necessary that the

Municipal Corporation should put the land to any use by

itself and that it cannot let or sell the land to any

other body for public purposes. It was held that the

services rendered by the respondents No. 3 to 6 were

public utility services and were within the scope of

public purposes for which the land was reserved. All the

contentions raised by the petitioners were, therefore,

negatived and the petition was dismissed, which decision

has been challenged in the Letters Patent Appeal.

7. It has been contended before us on behalf of the

appellants of Letters Patent Appeal No. 576 of 1999 and

the petitioners of Special Civil Application No. 10744

of 1993 that, the land reserved for purposes mentioned in

clause (e) of section 40(3) of the Act cannot be disposed

of, nor can it be leased to any other authority and it

was required to be used by the appropriate authority

itself, which in the present case was the Municipal

Corporation. It is only the land which was reserved

under clause (jj) of section 40(3), that can be sold and

since clause (jj) came into force in 1986 after the Town

Planning Scheme was finalized, there was no question of

the Municipal Corporation being empowered to sell it or

give it on lease. It was also contended that particulars

of public purpose were required to be mentioned while

reserving the plot for a public purpose in the scheme and

that the expression `sub-center' being a vague

expression, there was no reservation made for any

particular purpose, as was required to be done under

clause (e) of section 40(3). It was contended that the

use for public purpose should be indicated in view of

section 40(3)(e) and 44(b) of the Act, because, otherwise

there would be no proper opportunity to the public to

raise objections under section 47 against any vague

expression like `sub-center'. It was argued that public

of the area is entitled to know for what purpose the land

is reserved, the kind of purpose should be stated and the

proposition that one public purpose is as good as the

other is not warranted by the provisions of the Act. It

was further contended that section 52(1)(i) of the Act

shows that there was a dichotomy maintained between

public purpose and the purposes of appropriate authority

and therefore, change between public purpose and public

purpose of appropriate authority will amount to a

variation for which the procedure laid down under section

70 or 71 for variation, would be required to be followed.

It was then contended that the plot was reserved for the

appropriate authority only and therefore, it cannot be

used by any other authority. The counsel further argued

that vesting in the appropriate authority of the land

under section 67(a) was for a purpose and the appropriate

authority did not become an absolute owner so as to

become entitled to deal with the property in any manner

that it liked. It was also argued that the Telecom

Centre, Bank or office of the I.O.C. would not be

"sub-center". It was contended that the

Telecommunication Department operates throughout the

country and not in a sub-center. It was also contended

that the respondent Municipal Corporation has profiteered

by the transaction in respect of the land reserved for

sub-center. The counsel for the petitioner - Trust

contended further that the petitioner being a public

trust can also use the land for a public purpose, and

therefore, it should be restored to the Trust.

7.1 Reliance is placed by the learned counsel

appearing for the original petitioners on the following

decisions:-

[a] The decision in The Fruit & Vegetable Merchants

Union v. The Delhi Improvement Trust, reported

in AIR 1957 SC 344 is cited in support of the

contention that the land which was required by

the appropriate authority vested in the

Corporation only for a limited purpose. In the

case before the Supreme Court, by an agreement

between the Secretary of State for India in

Council and the Delhi Improvement Trust, a

certain area of Nazul land belonging to the

Government was placed at the disposal of the

Trust for `orderly expansion of Delhi under the

supervision of a single authority'. The question

that had arisen was, whether the land together

with the market was government property to which

the provisions of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent

Control Act were not applicable. It was held

that, on construction of the agreement that the

title to land on which the market stood was not

conveyed by the government to the trust, and that

the words `the trust shall hold and manage the

said Nazul Estate on behalf of the Government"

could not be construed as transferring title to

the Nazul land from Government to the Trust.

They amounted to constituting the trust as an

agent of the Government to hold possession of the

property and to manage the same for the purpose

for which the trust was created. The Supreme

court observed that the word `vest' has not got a

fixed connotation so as to mean that in all cases

the property is owned by the person or the

authority in whom it vests. It may vest in

title, or it may vest in possession, or it may

vest in a limited sense, as indicated in the

context in which it may have been used in a

particular piece of legislation. It may be noted

that the Supreme Court categorically observed

that, in the cases contemplated by sections 16

and 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, the property

acquired becomes the property of the Government

without any conditions or limitations either as

to title or possession, and that the legislature

has made it clear that the vesting of the

property is not for any limited purpose or

limited duration.

[b] The decision in Dr. G.N.Khajuria v. Delhi

Development Authority, reported in AIR 1996 SC

253 was cited to point out that, in a case where

the land was allotted for a park, it was held

that it was not open to the Delhi Development

Authority to carve out a portion from the park

for running a nursery school. The Supreme court

therefore cancelled the allotment in favour of

the school giving time to run the school for a

period of six months to enable it to make

alternative arrangements.

8. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents

argued that the user of the plots in question in these

areas was designated for "sub-center" which was a public

purpose, because, in sub-centers, the activities which

are to be carried out are meant for achieving public

purposes. It was argued that the town planning schemes

were never challenged by any of these parties and they

became final and it was not open for these petitioners

now to question the Schemes on the ground that the

expression `sub-center' used for the purpose of reserving

the land for public purposes was vague, and that they did

not understand it. It was contended that expression

`sub-center' was well known in the realm of town planning

and it covers various activities including the public

utility services, government offices etc. in the

sub-center in which commercial activities are carried

out. It was strongly contended that the title of the

original owners in the lands in question was lost and

these lands reserved for "sub-center" vested absolutely

in the appropriate authority, which in the present case

was the Municipal Corporation, free from all encumbrances

and the statutory body could deal with such lands for

achieving the public purposes in a manner as it may find

to be appropriate. It was contended that all activities

cannot be carried out by the Corporation itself, and that

what was important was the public purpose for which the

land was put to use, and not that the Corporation shall

itself put it to such use. The Municipal Corporation may

itself put the land to such use or may cause it to be so

put. All the activities involving public purposes are

not performed by the Corporation itself and there are

innumerable other authorities which carried out

activities which are in public interest and provide for

public conveniences. It was argued that "sub-center" can

be used for telephone exchanges, banks and other public

utility and services, offices etc. for the convenience

of the public of the area. Reliance was placed on the

guidelines issued by the Centre for Research,

Documentation & Training, Institute of Town Planners,

India published by the Ministry of Urban Affairs &

Employment, Government of India, New Delhi to indicate

the variety of activities which can be carried out in

commercial centers or sub-centers. It was also argued

that the expression `sub-center' will get colour from the

context of the town planning scheme and that as per the

Regulations, construction activities contemplated in

residential zones would include development activity of

establishing banks also. It was contended that large

amounts were already paid by these statutory bodies to

the Municipal Corporation and that this litigation has

thwarted the progress of the work which was intended to

be done for achieving the public purposes for which the

lands were reserved in the town planning scheme.

8.1 The learned counsel for the respondents relied on

the following decisions :-

[a] The decision in Netaji Bag v. The State of West

Bengal, reported in J.T. 200 (Suppl.1) SC 181

was cited for the proposition that, in absence of

statutory restriction, the action of the State of

transferring its property by way of sale or lease

is to be tested on the touch-stone of public

interest or public purpose. It was held that,

when State action is challenged, the initial

burden of showing prima facie existence of

violation of constitutional mandate is on the

person challenging the action. The Supreme Court

held that the Constitutional Courts cannot be

expected to presume the alleged irregularities,

illegalities or unconstitutionality nor the

courts can substitute their opinion for the

bonafide opinion of the State executive. The

Courts are not concerned with the ultimate

decision but only with the fairness of the

decision-making process. On the facts of the

case, it was found that the appellants had

miserably failed to place on record or to point

out any alleged constitutional vice or

illegality.

[b] The decision in Forward Construction Co. v.

Prabhat Mandal (Regd.), Andheri, reported in AIR

1996 SC 391 was referred with a view to point out

that it is only when the user was to be

completely or substantially changed, a prior

modification of the development plan would be

necessary, and that the general meaning of the

word `change' is `to make or become different, to

transform or convert'. As held by the Supreme

court, in that case, where the plot was

sanctioned for building a bus depot was used for

a bus depot combined with a commercial use to

augment the income of the Corporation for public

purpose, the user of the plot could not be said

to have been changed.

[c] The decision in Shri Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil

v. The State of Maharashtra, reported in J.T.

1996 (9) SC 258 was cited to point out that the

Supreme Court in a case where the town planning

scheme was approved for acquiring the land for

utilization thereof for the stated scheme, and

after utilization of land, surplus land was

sought to be used for allotment to some of the

councilors and the employees of the Kolhapur

Municipality, held, repelling the claim for the

land being restituted to the owner that, "We do

not think that this Court would be justified in

making direction for restitution of the land to

the erstwhile owners when the land was taken way

back and vested in the Municipality free from all

encumbrances. ............. It is axiomatic

that the land acquired for a public purpose would

be utilized for any other public purpose, though

use of it was intended for the original public

purpose. It is not intended that any land which

remain unutilised, should be restituted to the

erstwhile owner to whom adequate compensation was

paid according to the market value as on the date

of the notification."

[d] The decision in Union of India v. Jaswant Rai

Kochhar, reported in J.T. 1996 (3) SC 671 was

cited for the proposition that the land sought to

be acquired for public purpose may be used for

another public purpose. The Supreme Court held

that when the notification has mentioned that the

land is sought to be acquired for housing scheme

but it is sought to be used for District Centre,

the public purpose does not cease to be public

purpose.

[e] The decision in The Jalgaon Municipal Council v.

M.N.Venkatachaliah, reported in J.T. 1991 (1) SC

605 was cited to point out that if construction

of commercial building on municipal land is done

under an agreement by developer who financed and

executed the project, that was not impermissible

or arbitrary. It was held that in the ever

increasing tempo of urban life, wide range of

policy options not inconsistent with the

objective of the statute are permissible.

[f] The decision in C. Padma v. Deputy Secretary to

the Government of Tamil Nadu, reported in (1997)

2 SCC 627 was cited for the proposition that,

where the lands are acquired and have vested in

the State under the Land Acquisition Act, the

claimants were not entitled to restitution of

possession on the ground that original public

purpose had ceased to be in operation or that the

land could not be used for any other purpose.

[g] The decision in State of Gujarat v. Shantilal

Mangaldas, reported in AIR 1969 SC 634 was cited

for the proposition that, under section 53 of the

Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954, it was expressly

provided that, on the coming into force of the

scheme, the lands required for public purpose

shall, unless it is otherwise determined in such

scheme, vest absolutely in the local authority

free from all encumbrances and that the clause

contemplated transfer of ownership from private

owners to the local authority. The Act was

therefore a law for compulsory acquisition of

land.

[h] The decision in Rudradhar R. Trivedi v. State

of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1996 SC 3457, was

referred to for the proposition that it is a

settled law that the land acquired for public

purpose can be transferred to another public

purpose. Paramount consideration will be service

of public purpose and the validity of acquisition

cannot be assailed on the ground of such

transfer.

[i] The decision in Mayank Rastogi v. V.K. Bansal,

reported in AIR 1998 SC 716 was cited to point

out that the Supreme Court in a case where plot

earlier earmarked as open space was used for

construction of a residential house, held that,

merely because at an earlier point of time when

the respondent had constructed his house, the

plot had been sold as an open space, it cannot

give a right to the respondent to ask the High

Court to prevent the construction on that area

when the respondent had chosen not to challenge

the change in the land use from open space to a

residential as per the approved plan.

[j] The decision of this Court in Kashiben wd/o

Pitamber Devchand v. State of Gujarat, reported

in Vol. XXX(2) GLR 1176 was cited for the

proposition that once a final scheme is prepared,

it is deemed to be a part of the Act and the

original owner loses all rights over the land and

has no locus standi to maintain a petition. In

that case, the original purpose for which the

development plan was submitted was that the land

was reserved for a playground for a school, while

later it was used for the purpose of cottage

industries. The Court negatived the contention

that since it was not the function of the

Municipal Corporation to have cottage industries,

the acquisition under the Town Planning Scheme

for cottage industries cannot be sustained. It

was noted that, under section 40 (3) (e) of the

Act, a Town Planning Scheme may make provision

for public purposes of all kind and held that,

having regard to the purpose for which the plot

was intended, it cannot be said that there was no

public purpose involved in it.

9. City planning is globally recognised as a normal

and identifiable function of the government. As a

government function, it involves the coordination of all

governmental activities that bear upon community growth

and developmental change. The ultimate goals of modern

urban planning have always been social with deep

involvement with intermediate economic objectives. The

physically oriented urban planning has the following

environmental objectives :

(i) The orderly arrangement of parts of the city

residential, business, industrial - so that each

part could perform its functions with minimum

cost and conflict;

(ii) An efficient system of circulation within the

city and to the outside world, using to the

maximum advantage all modes of transportation;

(iii) The development of each part of the city to

optimum standards, in terms of lot size,

sunlight, and green space in residential areas,

and parking and building spacing in business

areas;

(iv) The provision of safe, sanitary, and comfortable

housing in a variety of dwelling types to meet

the needs of all families;

(v) The provision of recreation, schools, and other

community services of adequate size, location,

and quality;

(vi) The provision of adequate and economical water

supply, sewerage, utilities, and public services.

For these purposes, devolution of powers to the

cities occurs through legislative acts that delegate

limited self-government to local corporations. By the

Constitution (Seventy - Fourth) Amendment Act, 1992,

Parts IX & IXA were introduced in the Constitution of

India entrusting the planning function to the local

bodies. Article 243-W enables legislature of a State to

endow Municipalities with such powers and authority as

may be necessary to enable them to function as

institutions of self-government with respect to;

(i) preparation of plans for economic development and

social justice;

(ii) the performance of functions and the

implementation of schemes as may be entrusted to

them including those in relation to the matters

listed in the Twelfth Schedule. (These include,

(i) Urban Planning including town planning, (ii)

Regulation of land use and construction of

buildings (iii) Planning for economic and social

development, and (iv) Public amenities and public

conveniences and other items mentioned in the

Schedule.)

10. The Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 was enacted to

consolidate and amend the law for the making and

execution of town planning schemes enjoining a duty on

every local authority to prepare a development plan for

the entire area within its jurisdiction. This Act was

repealed by the Gujarat Town Planning & Urban Development

Act, 1976 with a saving provision in section 124 thereof.

It was felt that if planning activities were undertaken

on a more rational and scientific basis with reference to

development of areas which are not necessarily restricted

to the areas within the jurisdiction of local

authorities, it will be possible to create better

environmental conditions. Therefore, the Act of 1954 was

replaced by a more comprehensive legislation.

10.1 Section 18 of the Act of 1954 and section 40 of

the Act of 1976 provided for making and contents of a

town planning scheme. Under section 40(3)(e) of the Act

of 1976, the town planning scheme made by the appropriate

authority may, inter alia, provide for "the allotment or

reservation of land for roads, open spaces, gardens,

recreation ground, schools, markets, green belts,

dairies, transport facilities, public purposes of all

kinds". Identical provision existed in section 18(2)(e)

of the Act of 1954. Section 18(2)(c) of the Act of 1954

provided that a town planning scheme may make provision

for "lay out of new streets or roads; construction,

diversion, extension, alteration, improvement and

stopping up of streets, roads and communications".

Similar provision is contained in section 40(3)(c) of the

Act of 1976. The appropriate authority (defined in

section 2(iii) of the Act of 1976), is required by

section 42 to make and publish draft scheme which as per

section 44(b) (corresponding to provision of section

25(b) of the Repealed Act) was required to contain

particulars of land allotted or reserved under clause (e)

of section 40(3) with a general indication of the uses to

which such land is to be put and the terms and conditions

for such uses. Developmental activities were restricted

by section 49 after the declaration of a scheme.

However, it will be significant to note that under

sub-section (4) of section 49, the restrictive provisions

of section 49 were not to apply to any "operational

construction" [which included any construction necessary

for posts and telegraphs, telephones, wireless,

broadcasting and other like forms of communications, as

defined in section 2 (xvii)], undertaken by the Central

Government or a State Government.

10.2 In the preliminary scheme, the town planning

officer shall under section 52(1) define and demarcate

the areas allotted to, or reserved for, any public

purpose, or for a purpose of the appropriate authority

and the final plots. In the final scheme, the town

planning officer shall under section 52(3), inter alia,

determine whether the area used, allotted or reserved for

a public purpose or purposes of appropriate authorities

are beneficial wholly or partly to the owners or

residents within the area of the Scheme, and calculate

the contribution to be levied under section 79(1) of the

Act.

11. On the strength of the above provisions of

section 40(3)(e), 44(b) and 52, the main thrust of the

argument for the petitioners was that the expression

`sub-center' did not indicate any use for a public

purpose, nor its kind and that, even if the plot is

allotted for a sub-center to the appropriate authority,

it is required to be used only by that authority for its

statutory functions and for no other purpose, nor by any

other authority, be it a Nationalised Bank or

Telecommunication Department of the Central Government.

12. The appropriate authority makes a town planning

scheme and in doing so, it is required to make provision

for any of the matters enumerated in section 40(3)(a) to

(l) and for such other matters, not inconsistent with the

object of the Act, as may be prescribed. The words

`allotment' and `reservation' occurring in section

40(3)(e) have different connotations. In allotment of

land, the land is allotted i.e. given or apportioned for

the task while reservation of land would mean the act or

instance by which the land is put aside or kept back for

a later occasion or special use. Thus, when the land is

allotted for roads, open spaces, gardens etc., it would

reflect that the land is already apportioned for the

purpose for which it is to be used. The decision to give

or apportion land for any of the purposes mentioned in

clause (e) can be taken on the basis of existing needs,

while the decision to reserve the land for such purposes

would depend on variety of factors which would include

the possible future requirements, the environmental

changes, the technological advances, the economic

activities, social and cultural milieu.

12.1 The objectives underlying town planning get new

insights from experience, research and technological

achievements. Inherent in the concept of city planning

is the recognition that an ideal is not a fixed objective

but will itself change, that the ideal city can be

striven toward but never achieved. The focus of planning

has to turn towards a stress upon the process and

direction of change. The interest of the owner and

developer of raw land is purely financial and temporary,

while the urban community must live with the results for

generations afterward; and the city planning would aim

not at any single problem but at the continuous

improvement of all aspects of the urban physical

environment through unified planning of the whole

development area. The process of city planning has a

cultural as well as a utilitarian value. The factors of

city living must be considered as a whole so that the

improvement is brought about in the urban environment

which would give the city dweller maximum amenity.

12.2 When town planning is expected to take care of

changes over a period of time, there is greater need to

vest the appropriate authority to reserve land for public

purposes of all kinds. Thus, under section 40(3)(e) of

the Act, land can be reserved for a public purpose of any

kind for which it may be needed in future for the

continuous process of developmental changes that may take

place in the area covered under the town planning scheme.

It would be retrograde to suggest that only land required

to be allotted i.e. given or apportioned for the

specifically named public purposes can be used for such

public purpose and no land can be reserved i.e. kept

back or put aside for a variety of public purposes for

which it may be required in future by passage of time for

a better planning of the city. Such interpretation will

destroy the operational efficacy of section 40(3)(e)

which is designed to enable the appropriate authority to

make provision to reserve land for all kinds of public

purposes for which it may be required even after the

scheme comes into force.

13. The services now provided by city governments are

different in nature and wider in scope than in the past.

The traditional services have been transformed beyond

recognition. Public utility services are frequently

provided by municipal governments which can do much to

assist industry and commerce by good planning and

physical development and provide convenient and agreeable

services. As municipal functions grow in scope and

personnel, there arises need for central location and

arrangement. The size of the city served determines the

range and number of municipal services required, which,

in turn, determine the size of the site. The programme

for civic centers in a large city will include not only a

City Hall, headquarters for police, fire and welfare

departments, court rooms, post office, the central

library, but also public utility offices, public health

facilities and office space for the municipal, State and

Central Governments as well. It is also desirable to

include open space in the plan. There should be an

architecturally and spatially well planned civic centers.

Public utility enterprises which are generally State

-owned and State-operated, provide certain classes of

services to the public including common carrier

transportation, telephone and telegraph, power and light,

and community facilities for water, sanitation and

similar services. Through the introduction of the

machine and mass production, economic life has moved out

of domestic environment in an area dominated by devices

and processes rather than by individuals, creating the

need for more specialized types of buildings for offices,

stores, markets, banks, warehouses, exhibition halls,

and, structures for transmission and reception of

telephone, telegraph, radio, television radar

communication, for printing, for factories, laboratories,

food processing, distribution, installation and so on.

The change in needs have to reflect in the wider range of

matters covered by section 40(3)(e) for which the

appropriate authority, whose functions are to be viewed

in the above constitutional perspective, may make

provisions in the town planning scheme not only to meet

with the present requirements but also to answer the

future needs. There can therefore be a valid

reservation, of a particular land, made in the town

planning scheme for public purposes for which it is

likely to be needed in future. There is no substance in

the contention that the reservation of the plots in

question in these two town planning schemes for the

public purpose of "sub-center" would not include the

public purpose for which the plots are now being put to

use, namely for telephone exchange or offices of the

nationalised banks or the Indian Oil Corporation.

14. The word `sub-center' is to be understood in

context of civil centers which can be effectively located

at the population centre, geographic center, or the

business centre of the locality. It is a grouping of

facilities for the convenience of the public. In the

Guidelines published by Centre for Research,

Documentation & Training, Institute of Town Planners,

India published by the Ministry of Urban Affairs &

Employment, Government of India in August 1996, while

suggesting "Norms & Standards" in Appendix `B' for urban

development plans under the head "Commercial Activity

(B.4.00 at page 152) hierarchy of commercial centres is

described as "a function of the hierarchy of planning

units in an urban centre". Thus, a community planning

unit will have a community centre, a district planning

unit a district centre, sub-city planning unit a sub-city

centre, and, a city planning unit a city centre. The

chart of 24 activities which can be provided in the

commercial centre is given in para B.4.40 at page 153 of

the said official publication. These include commercial

offices, service industries, local government offices,

telephone exchange, post & telegraph, petrol pump and

conveniences. A sub-center is thus a point or an area in

a city which has a group of buildings for any or more of

these activities. To provide for land for such

activities by allotment or by reservation is within the

domain of the appropriate authority under section

40(3)(e) of the Act when these constitute any of the

objects named or any kind of public purpose. In fact,

when the land is needed for the purposes of a town

planning scheme, it is deemed to be needed for a public

purpose, because, town planning is itself a public

purpose. When the land is put aside or kept back for

public purpose that may be spelt out at a later occasion,

then the appropriate authority will be able to put it to

use as and when the need arises for any kind of public

purpose. Therefore, land reserved for `sub-centre'

without specifying any particular public purpose could be

validly used for providing commercial offices, such as

banks, telephone exchanges and other public utility

offices and conveniences in the process of implementing

the town planning scheme. This gives an amount of

flexibility to the scheme to answer the ever increasing

needs of the society. There is a built in mechanism in

section 40(3)(e) to enable the appropriate authority to

set apart land for all kinds of public purposes which can

be spelt out by passage of time, as has been done in

these two schemes by reserving the plots in question

under the head "sub-center" which is well understood in

the field of town planning and embraces activities of

varying nature in a commercial centre. Therefore, there

does not arise any question of variation or change in the

scheme when the lands earmarked for `sub-center' are used

for any of the activities to be provided in a commercial

centre. There is no element of arbitrariness involved

when the lands reserved for `sub-centre' are put to such

use and the challenge on the ground of violation of

Article 14 must fail.

15. To suggest that the appropriate authority which

makes the town planning scheme which provides for the

allotment or reservation of land for purposes mentioned

in section 40(3)(e) which included public purposes of all

kinds should itself utilise the land and that it cannot

be utilized by any other agency to which the appropriate

authority entrusts the development for the purpose of

implementing the town planning scheme, would result in

stultifying this provision. It is an unfortunate aspect

of inner urban planning that the cities that have the

means to build a civic centre frequently lack the

necessary space, and the cities that have enough space,

often lack the proper funds. This is why, under section

23(1), the powers and functions of urban development

authority include the power to enter into contracts,

agreements or arrangements with any local authority,

person or organisation, as it may consider necessary for

performing its functions. Thus, its functions of

executing the works named or of providing other services

and amenities under clause (a) of section 23(1) can be

performed by any local authority, person or organisation

by resorting to clause (viii) of section 23(1) of the

Act. The urban authority or its delegate which is

appropriate authority can acquire, hold, manage and

dispose of property as it may deem necessary, under

section 23(1)(vii) of the Act. It would therefore be

naive to suggest that the appropriate authority cannot

entrust the developmental work of any plot which is

reserved for public purpose to anyone else and should

itself do it.

16. The lands which are required by the appropriate

authority, unless it is otherwise determined in the

scheme, vest absolutely in the appropriate authority free

from all encumbrances. The lands required for any public

purpose or for a purpose of the appropriate authority

will all vest absolutely in the appropriate authority

under section 67(a), on the day the preliminary scheme

comes into force. All rights in the original plots which

are reconstituted come to an end as provided in section

67(b). There is absolutely no scope for restoring the

lands vesting in the appropriate authority to the

original owners whose rights are determined. The event

is irreversible and no such land can be traced by the

original owner in the hands of the appropriate authority

which alone can deal with it in exercise of its powers

and functions under section 23 of the Act. Even when the

appropriate authority is dissolved by a notification

issued by the State Government under section 120 of the

Act, all properties which are vested in the appropriate

authority shall vest in the State Government, as provided

in sub-section (2) of section 120. The appellants and

the petitioners would be nowhere in picture to pitch any

claim even if the land is not actually put to use or is

used through some other agency under an arrangement or

contract with the appropriate authority for creating a

sub-center for any such activity as of establishing

commercial offices, telephone exchange, banks, or,

providing other conveniences which can be provided in a

commercial center. The contention that the proprietary

rights of the petitioners are violated is therefore

wholly misconceived.

17. Thus, not only the appropriate authority could

have itself put to use the land earmarked for the public

purpose of a "sub-centre" involving any of the activities

which may be provided in a commercial centre, but it

could legitimately cause the same to be used by other

authorities for such activities, which include commercial

offices, telephone exchange or other public utility

offices. The appellants and the petitioners of these two

cases have no right to insist that the local authority

should itself put the lands in question to such use or

that they cannot be given for such use to the

Telecommunication Department, the Banks, or the Indian

Oil Corporation. They also do not have any right to

claim these lands on any ground whatsoever, and they must

therefore fail.

18. The appellant trust has prayed for dereservation

and restoration of land which vested in the appropriate

authority, and the power of attorney holder of the

petitioners of Special Civil Application No. 10744 of

1993 empowered its holder to get the land dereserved by

fling litigation, though there was no statutory provision

to dereserve the lands which have vested in the

appropriate authority under the Act and the town planning

schemes were never challenged by these parties. These

litigations are therefore purely speculative and have

resulted in delaying the use of the lands in furtherance

of the schemes. The appellants and the petitioners of

these two cases must therefore bear the cost of such

frivolous litigation, which is quantified at Rs.10,000=00

to be paid by the appellant of the Letters Patent Appeal

and Rs.10,000=00 to be paid by the petitioners of Special

Civil Application, to the respondent - Municipal

Corporation in each case.

19. The Letters Patent Appeal is accordingly

dismissed. The Special Civil Application is also

rejected. The appellant and the petitioners in these two

cases shall pay the costs of the proceedings to the

respondent

the parties will bear their own costs. Interim relief

stands vacated in both the cases.

MARCH 27, 2001 [ R.K.ABICHANDANI, J. ]

[ M.C.PATEL, J. ]

parmar*



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